

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)

ACIS 1372/87

ER 1961X 87

ER 2109X 87

SUBJECT: INF Inspections
Protocol &
Exemptions

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	NIO/USSR		X		
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	D/SOVA/DI		X		
21	D/OSWR/DI		X		
22			X		

P ~~SUSPENSE~~

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary
5 Jun '87

Date

3637 (10-81)

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Executive Registry

87-2109X

SYSTEM II

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
THE US INF NEGOTIATOR

SUBJECT: INF Inspections Protocol and Exemptions (C)

Following a review of agency views as transmitted to the NSC by the INF Interdepartmental Group and as discussed on May 28 by the Senior Arms Control Group, the following decisions have been made by the President concerning the INF Protocol on Inspections.

- Agencies are to complete, no later than June 18, final work on identifying possible exemptions criteria and procedures, as well as any proposed alternative texts on exemptions, in the Protocol on Inspections.
- Pending completion of the above work, the current placeholder text on this issue in the Protocol on Inspections will be maintained, i.e., as "criteria to be agreed."
- Appropriate consultations with our basing-country Allies are authorized on aspects of the Protocol on Inspections other than the exemptions issue.
- During the above consultations, Allied views should be solicited on an annual quota ranging from 5-10 short-notice inspection on Allied territory at what the Soviets claim to be undeclared US facilities, possibly limiting the number to be held at US facilities in any one basing country.
- The INF Interdepartmental Group should review the relationship and/or negotiating leverage, if any, between the annual number of short-notice inspections at undeclared sites and the elimination of all LRINF.

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Declassify on: OADR

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
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- 2 -

- The Analysis Group of the Arms Control Verification Committee is to provide by June 18 a brief independent assessment of the draft INF Protocol on Inspections, and other INF Treaty Protocols, similar to that provided to the NSC on the draft U.S. Treaty banning chemical weapons. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. L. Powell', with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Colin L. Powell

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI				
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14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	NIO/USSR		X		
19	D/SOVA/DI		X		
20	D/OSWR/DI		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
(22)	ER				
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary
20 May '87

Date

3637 (10-81)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90482 and 90495

Executive Registry

37-1961X

SECRET

May 19, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
AMBASSADOR MAYNARD GLITMAN

SUBJECT: INF Inspections Protocol and Quotas (C)

Following a review of INF Interdepartmental Group's Decision Papers transmitted to the NSC on May 12 and 14, 1987 on INF inspections issues, decisions have been made that are to be incorporated into the proposed draft INF Protocol on Inspections and into the proposed INF Draft Treaty. (C)

The decisions are as follows:

I - INF Protocol on Inspections

For text agreed among agencies, the Protocol is approved as transmitted to the NSC. For the remaining unresolved issues:

-- Concerning exemption for sensitive facilities at undeclared sites, in view of the special complexities and national security sensitivities involved, this issue will be the focus of an early meeting of the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG), time to be announced.

-- Concerning stand-down obligations, the two additional obligations proposed will not be required by the US.

II - INF Inspection Quotas

For declared sites, the proposed annual quota should be the greater of either: 1) no more than 20 percent of the number of declared facilities, or 2) five.

For undeclared sites, the proposed annual quota should be five. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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The INF interdepartmental Group will incorporate the above decisions into the appropriate documents, to be discussed, as appropriate, with Allied basing countries. (C)

Following such discussions, the INF Interdepartmental Group will complete such additional work as may be required as a result of the discussions with Allies. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Frank C. Carlucci

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
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ACIS - 1372/87

28 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence StaffSUBJECT: Senior Arms Control Meeting on On-Site Inspection and
Monitoring [REDACTED]1. This memorandum is for your information, unless you wish to provide
comments or instructions to me. [REDACTED]2. On 13 May, my predecessor [REDACTED] sent forward a memorandum
explaining Community views on the subject of exemptions to On-Site Inspections
in the INF Treaty domain. This memorandum is attached for your information.
[REDACTED]3. On 26 May, Dr. Ikle held an informal meeting to discuss this issue.
He primarily sought the views of Fred Eimer from ACDA and myself. It was
clear from Dr. Ikle's comments that he is very concerned about precedence
being set for On-Site Inspections and their potential impact on START. He
clearly views this issue as one requiring careful and full consideration.
[REDACTED]4. A Senior Arms Control Group meeting has been called for 3:00
Thursday, May 28. [REDACTED] will assist me in my presentations at that
meeting. I anticipate no changes in our current position. It is my guess
that a likely outcome of this meeting, although not certain, is the
recommendation that the US Government present no specific language to the
Soviets on exemptions; that we would provide a general statement of principal
and elicit Soviet views on on-site inspection procedures and regimes. [REDACTED]5. I do not anticipate that the final recommendation on this issue, that
is, whether or not to include specific exemptions to On-Site Inspections, will
be reached soon. I will keep you advised. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]Attachment:
As statedcc: DDI
Ch/NIC

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C-119-1525X1

SECRET, [REDACTED]

ACIS - 1372/87
28 May 1987

SUBJECT: Senior Arms Control Meeting on On-Site Inspection and
Monitoring [REDACTED]

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DDI/ACIS: [REDACTED] 28May87

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SECRET, [REDACTED]

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ACIS - 1348/87-b
13 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: ..

Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

25X1

SUBJECT: On-Site Inspection and Monitoring

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1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. The question of which government and related facilities should be liable to on-site inspections and monitoring (OSI/M) has only come up explicitly twice in the last five years. One instance involved chemical weapons, and Rick Burt ran an end-of-round play in the Executive Branch with the result that Vice President Bush tabled a CW Treaty involving mandatory challenge inspection without exemptions of all government-related facilities.

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3. The more recent and important case involves the INF Treaty. We have argued that exemptions have to exist for reasons of national security or sovereignty. DOE and State agree wholeheartedly. JCS is torn between us and OSD. OSD, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level (i.e., Frank Gaffney), thinks exemptions are a mistake. But Dr. Ikle thinks, apparently, that exemptions may be required.

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4. Attached is a copy of a memorandum from Dr. Ikle about this subject. Also attached is a copy of a decision paper (as well as the basic protocol itself) in which the DCI's Representative has explained the need for exemptions, using highly-similar logic to that of Dr. Ikle (see clips, asterisks). In any case, the key points are:

-- The Executive Branch does not have much of an explicit idea what it is doing here; and,

-- The political fallout from an unthoughtful and unthoughtout approach to OSI/M will be large, beginning with the Congress.

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5. In our creation of our view, we involved the General Counsel's staff, as well as other key members of US intelligence. Not everyone got everything they wanted, but I think the DCI's equities are protected well for now.

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6. What more may we do for you here?

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Attachments: As stated

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